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Quantum computational
supremacy:
Security and vulnerability
in a new paradigm
Deborah Brennan

Abstract
Despite three decades of research, the field of quantum computation has yet to
build a quantum computer that can perform a task beyond the capability of any
classical computer – an event known as computational supremacy. Yet this multibillion dollar research industry persists in its efforts to construct such a machine.
Based on the counter-intuitive principles of quantum physics, these devices are
fundamentally different from the computers we know. It is theorised that largescale quantum computers will have the ability to perform some remarkably
powerful computations, even if the extent of their capabilities remains disputed.
One application, however, the factoring of large numbers into their constituent
primes, has already been demonstrated using Shor’s quantum algorithm. This
capability has far reaching implications for cybersecurity as it poses an
unprecedented threat to the public key encryption that forms an important
component of the security of all digital communications. This paper outlines the
nature of the threat that quantum computation is believed to pose to digital
communications and investigates how this emerging technology, coupled with the
threat of Adversarial Artificial Intelligence, may result in large technology
companies gaining unacceptable political leverage; and it proposes measures that
might be implemented to mitigate this eventuality.
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Introduction
Scholarship in communications and media literacy has advanced into the 21st
century too often by merely appending the word ‘digital’ to its categories of
interest, and by adopting software-based tools to conduct some of its research.
While long-term continuities in the issues affecting media production and
dissemination are undoubtedly important, and there has been no shortage of
investigation based upon the peculiar modes and interactions of the online
communications environment, there has been a tendency for research to stop
outside the door of computation itself, so that even the all-important algorithms
that govern the behaviour of social media platforms are more likely to be
mentioned in passing than probed in depth. Such relative indifference to
computation would be more justifiable if we could assume, as many writers do,
that technological advances in computing occur at a steady and predictable rate
as the commercial focus of computation shifts to data analytics and methods of
artificial intelligence (AI) such as machine learning (ML) and natural language
processing (NLP). This assumption, however, ignores significant advances in the
field of quantum computation. As one important scholar in this area stated in
March 2018: ‘Whoever can build a fully functioning quantum computer will rule
the world’ (Soo, 2018). In this paper, I will interrogate this proposition by exploring
the ramifications of these advances for online security and further corporate
control of the Internet. The sections on quantum computers and P vs NP contain
elements of quantum physics and mathematics, respectively, which I have
attempted to present as clearly as possible with no prior knowledge required of
the reader. I hope that the reader may enjoy these sections – however, the paper
may be read without them.

Quantum computers
Despite three decades of research, as of 2018 quantum computation remains a
multi-billion dollar industry that has yet to produce a working prototype with more
than around 8 operational Bytes1. Potential quantum technologies are fraught
with issues deriving from the science on which they depend, nonetheless, all of
the major technology companies and a large number of governments and research
Opening the Facebook app and updating the stream, for example, might take in the region of
10,000 times as many Bytes of data.
1
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institutes continue to invest heavily in the field. Google, IBM and Microsoft along
with the Chinese technology companies Alibaba and Tencent all have quantum or
hybrid quantum-artificial intelligence (AI) laboratories with large research
budgets. Government investments have also been generous, with the European
Commission, for example, pledging €1 billion for research into quantum
technologies (European Commission, 2016). The stated goal of organisations
engaging in research in quantum computation is often the achievement of
computational supremacy, the point where a quantum computer performs a
computational task that is beyond the capability of any classical computer –
literally a paradigm-changing event for information technology.
Quantum computers are entirely different in concept and operation from the
computers we commonly use. Quantum devices operate according to two key
postulates of quantum physics: superposition and entanglement. Superposition
means that each quantum bit, or qubit, can represent both 1 and 0 at the same
time whereas the more familiar bit must take either the value of 1 or 0.
Theoretically, a qubit in superposition can hold an infinite amount of information
which can be manipulated using quantum gates finally to yield a value of either 0
or 1 on measurement2. It is theorised that this is one of the sources of the power
of quantum computation. Entanglement means that qubits in a superposition can
be correlated with each other allowing them to work together to facilitate
something like massive parallel processing on a single device3. Quantum
computers will exploit these properties to solve some problems that are
considered very difficult or impossible using classical computers, and they will
solve some of these problems at incredibly high speeds. The rewards for working
hardware running novel algorithms from this new paradigm are expected to be
very high, with promises of technologies offering considerable advances in fields
such as artificial intelligence, molecular simulation, hyperreal gaming and stock
market prediction.

This is according to the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics via the socalled collapse of the wave function; the Multiverse or Many Worlds interpretation offers a
different explanation. See, for example, Vaidman (2014)
3 The mechanism by which this speedup occurs is still disputed and its nature has far reaching
consequences for both quantum physics and quantum information theory. It has been suggested
that the speedup lies either in quantum dynamics (Schrödinger equation) or in the quantum state
itself (the wave function, 𝛹).
2
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The extraordinary properties of entangled quantum bits in superposition mean
that even a very small number can perform remarkable computation. The most
important quantum algorithm to date, the factoring algorithm due to Peter Shor
(1994), is considered capable of factoring large integers (numbers) to their
constituent primes by creating a what Pitowsky terms a ‘clever superposition’
(2002) of entangled qubits and extracting a solution in a short, or polynomial, time
frame4. On a functioning 100 bit quantum computer, Shor’s algorithm could break
RSA, the most commonly used public key encryption protocol on the Internet, in
hours to days. Scaling up to Quantum Kilo Bytes, RSA public key encryption
becomes completely ineffective.
Shor’s algorithm belongs to a very significant class of quantum algorithms known
as the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP). Variants of this problem have been
discovered that can, in theory, solve the mathematics behind RSA, ECDSA and DSA
(Grosshans et al., 2015), all of the main public key encryption protocols in current
use on the Internet. Clearly, quantum technologies pose a very real threat to
current information security.

The nature of information security
There are many ways to conceptualise information security and this paper does
not intend to detail these to any great degree; rather it endeavors to convey the
idea that security needs to be complete, that every component of information
security is a potential weak point that can be exploited regardless of the strength
of the other components, much like how an open window in an otherwise secure
building constitutes a weakness in its security. For the purposes of this paper the
simple, but widely used, principles of the CIA Triad of Information Security 5 –
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (Lefkovitz et al., 2017) – will be sufficient.
Ensuring a high degree of confidentiality requires, but is not limited to, employing
measures to actively ensure that sensitive information is not intercepted by
unauthorized parties while in transit or in storage, while ensuring that resources

Shor’s algorithm has been run successfully on a true quantum device and has demonstrated the
factorisation of small numbers, but the principle is proven for large numbers although there may
be issues with scaling.
5 The CIA Triad is a widely adopted information security benchmark model used to evaluate the
information security of an organization, other models may be used to model individual aspects of
security e.g. the PAIN (Privacy, Authority, Integrity & Non-Repudiation) model for cryptography.
4
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are available to intended parties. Integrity means that data must not be altered in
transit or in storage without authorization; among other measures this involves
both symmetric (private key) and asymmetric (public key) encryption protocols.
Ensuring availability includes security against denial of service (DoS) attacks that
consume the entirety of a network’s resources, making them unavailable to
legitimate users. Because of their threat to public key encryption, Shor’s and
similar HSP algorithms are known to pose a risk to two of the Triad’s components,
confidentiality and integrity. It is also thought that other quantum algorithms,
such as variants of Grover’s algorithm (1996), may be used to exploit weaknesses
in the implementation of some private key schemes6.
Even without the use of quantum technologies, systems are under constant
attack. Absolute security of data is impossible to achieve (and sometimes not
desired7) and the cost increases greatly with the degree of security provided. A
large proportion of costs incurred is due to the higher processing overheads
required for stronger encryption; the other large cost is security expertise8.
Different levels of security are provided for different internet and cloud services;
for example, security policies for Internet banking are stricter than those for social
media sites and messaging systems. A balance is always struck on the basis of the
conflicting constraints of security and performance9, legal constraints and the
value of the data to be protected. Although security systems vary greatly in terms
of composition and policy, practically all use the same or very similar encryption
protocols and these protocols all face the same risks, real and potential, from
quantum computers10.

The P vs. NP conundrum
Mitigating the threat of quantum computers has been largely reduced to finding
replacement algorithms for those behind the Public Key Protocols in current use,
and this is not only because this is where the imminent threat is widely held to lie.

There may be other, as yet undiscovered, quantum algorithms which could threaten these
same, and other, aspects of information security.
7 This point is supported by the classification of cryptographic technologies as munitions under
US law until 1992; certain restrictions remain under international agreements.
8 Other costs include the cost of updating to current versions of software and software licences
for firewalls and other security specific softwares.
9 Strong encryption slows performance and can make system unacceptably slow for end users.
10 Computer systems face very many other security threats; this will be discussed later.
6
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Despite early successes in the field, quantum information theory has produced
only a few algorithms, including Shor’s, that have been demonstrated capable of
exponential speed up over their classical counterparts (Montanaro, 2015).
Furthermore, many researchers are of the view that the once promised ubiquitous
parallel processing power of quantum algorithms is in reality only possible in a
very limited set of cases (Aaronson, 2013). The problem, they claim, comes down
to the mathematics, specifically the computational complexity class of the
mathematical problems under consideration.
Loosely speaking11, computational complexity is a measure of how much
computational resource (time, energy, etc) it takes a computer to find a solution
to a mathematical problem and in particular, the manner in which the resource
requirement grows as input size grows (e.g. polynomially or exponentially). In
computational complexity theory, class P (polynomial time) are relatively easy
problems for computers so, on average, take few resources or short time to solve.
For an average input, class NP (nondeterministic polynomial time) problems take
a lot more computational resources to solve and so a lot more time12. Rarely, a
problem can be thought to be in NP but turns out to also be in P when a solution
is found that is ‘simpler’ than expected. It can also be unclear to which class(es) a
particular problem belongs 13.
In order to solve difficult problems in NP 14 in a short time frame (or, equivalently,
with few resources) these problems would need to reduced or broken down to a
set of simpler problems in P. It is conjectured, but not proven, that this is not
possible (Gill, 1977). The question is described in complexity theory as P vs NP and
has great significance for computation in general15. It is argued that the
capabilities of quantum computers are limited by the conjecture that P does not
equal NP (Aaronson, 2013), that the class of problems in NP that are not also in P
For understandability, what is presented is really a description of computational difficulty
which is in many ways analogous to computational complexity.
12 Individual instances of a problem type can take significantly longer or shorter time to solve.
13 There are more classes in the computational complexity hierarchy. This discussion is limited to
P and NP for clarity and understandability and as P vs NP may be significant in quantum
information theory.
14 These problems are not also in the P complexity class, so do not have polynomial time
solutions.
15 The P vs NP is highly important in complexity theory, for both classical and quantum
computing, it was chosen as one of the 7 most significant unsolved mathematical problems by
the Clay Mathematics Institute, The Millennium Problems (Clay Mathematics Institute, 2000).
11
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cannot be reduced to a set of simpler problems that can be solved easily and
quickly, even by a quantum computer 16. A subset of the NP class that is of
particular interest to the field of quantum information theory, and any threat it
poses to information security, is the NP-Complete class. NP-Complete problems17
are a set of problems for which finding a solution to any one problem will also
provide a solution to all other problems in the NP-Complete set. In other words, if
a polynomial time solution is found for any one NP-Complete problem, it is found
for all NP-Complete problems.
The mathematical problem of factoring products of large prime numbers into their
constituent parts, that problem that lies behind the security of the RSA security
protocol, is likely to be in class NP18 but very significantly not in NP-Complete.
Consequently, the fact that Shor’s algorithm has been successfully ‘demonstrated’
on quantum hardware has no predictive value for the success or otherwise of
quantum algorithms in general. Still, regardless of how widely held the conjecture
that P ≠ NP is, it remains conjecture. Furthermore, quantum algorithms differ
significantly in structure and execution from their classical counterparts and,
perhaps more importantly, are hardware dependent, which is not the case for
most classical algorithms. For these reasons, the complexity of quantum
algorithms is measured according to a different complexity class system which
does not map directly to the classical system. For example, BQP and QMA are
generally considered to be the bounded-error quantum analogues 19 of the
classical complexity classes P and NP respectively (Aaronson, 2009); however,
Shor’s algorithm is believed to belong to NP in the classical system but not QMA
in the quantum system, reflecting the fact that there exists no known classical
algorithm that can factor large integers to their constituent prime factors in
polynomial (or short) time.
There remains much to be reconciled and understood in the mathematics and
physics that underpin the paradigm of quantum computing. The opinions of those
considered experts in the field vary widely: for example, Scott Aaronson, a
The significance of NP-Complete complexity for quantum information theory will be discussed
later.
17 Problem here means ‘problem type’ e.g. The Knapsack Problem or the Graph Colouring
Problem not individual instances of that problem.
18 Prime Factoring is also believed to be in both P and CoNP but is not considered to be NPComplete so that Shor’s algorithm does not solve the P vs NP problem.
19 For discussion see, for example, Younes & Rowe (2015).
16
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prominent quantum computation scholar, holds that P ≠ NP indeed sharply limits
the possibilities of quantum computers; another prominent scholar, John Preskill,
holds that quantum computers will themselves accelerate the development of
quantum algorithms, addressing problems in ways that may not be immediately
explicable; and David Deutch, a founder of the field, contends that the theory of
quantum computation can be generalised to all physical processes in a complex
multiverse, with classical computing explained as a special instance within a
quantum paradigm.
It is not disputed, however, that Shor’s algorithm itself is mathematically possible
and verified, meaning that it works in principle. It has been demonstrated in
practice for small integers (numbers) on working prototypes of quantum
computers and so it is reasonable to think that the factoring of large numbers into
their constituent primes is a possibility that may continue to become easier,
cheaper and more available as quantum technologies mature, making quantum
computing a legitimate concern for information security in the near to medium
term.
Currently, almost all security on the Internet uses the type of encryption that could
be broken by a quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm as part of one or more
protocols; this includes all app messaging encryption, email, current browser
security, Internet banking and logins to cloud resources. Such evident risk might
suggest we change our security protocols to ones that rely on NP-Complete
problems, that is to mathematical problems to which no solution algorithm
provides any significant speed up over trying every possible solution until the
correct answer is found. These are problems that most mathematicians believe
to be impossible to solve easily for all cases, in the classical paradigm at least.
There are a number of difficulties with this approach: public key cryptography, as
it is currently conceived, relies on mathematical problems that are hard to solve
every time no matter what the numbers are, otherwise some keys would be easy
to discover or ‘crack’ and, in an operational security protocol, it would likely be
impractical to ‘filter out’ these weak keys. Many, if not most, known problems in
NP-Complete have so called ‘easy instances’ ruling them out as candidates (Talbot
and Welsh, 2006). Another requirement for public key encryption systems is that
the mathematical problem has an intentional ‘hidden trap door’ which effectively
means that if a party has a key, they can easily decrypt a message. (This property
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is often erroneously referred to as ‘being a one-way function’. The existence of
true one-way functions has not been proven and if it were, it would prove that P
≠ NP.) (Hartmanis & Hemachandra,1999). In addition to these two primary
requirements for an ideal post-quantum encryption protocol, there are many
other requirements around resources, implementation and practical integration
with existing systems and protocols. In short, finding suitable candidate algorithms
is enormously challenging.

The search for post-quantum algorithms
In response to the potential threat that the quantum computing paradigm poses
to information security, in December 2016 the US National Institute for Standards
in Technology (NIST) issued a call for a first round of proposals for new so called
quantum resistant algorithms to be used in the development of cryptographic
standards (NIST, 2016). The standards are to be published as Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPSs)20 or Special Publications (SPs). NIST invites and
encourages participation from the cryptographic community as well as the general
public in a process of finding a number of candidate replacement algorithms. The
first of what is expected to be several rounds of submissions closed in November
2017 with 69 submissions accepted, of which five have subsequently been
withdrawn.
NIST’s approach is cautious, recognising that ‘the current scientific understanding
of the power of quantum computers is far from comprehensive’ (NIST, 2017) and
that candidate solution algorithms may be based on significantly different
mathematics and design from those in current use. The organisation anticipates
that the evaluation process may be ‘significantly more complex’ than the
evaluation of the SHA-3 Hash algorithm candidates (Alshaikhli et al., 2012), for
example, a process which took about eight years from call for proposals to official
release of protocol details. This is without any acceptance period (where the
community gains trust in the algorithm through its resistance to attack),

FIPS comprises 4 security levels and is the de facto international standard for information
security prescribing not only cryptography but also security policy and hardware measures (e.g.
tamper evident enclosures and true atomic-decay random number generation).
20
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commercial implementation and roll-out, processes which together may take the
same number of years again.21
NIST has also stated that it believes that the transition should happen well in
advance of the appearance of large scale quantum computers ‘so that any
information that is later compromised by quantum cryptanalysis is no longer
sensitive when that compromise occurs’ (NIST, 2016). This is interesting on two
counts, the first being that there exist current trusted cryptographic algorithms for
data storage that are believed to be resistant to all currently known quantum
algorithms (NIST, 2018) (even those which have never been implemented in
hardware), implying that NIST expects that the field of quantum computation to
produce more and different algorithms. This would suggest that NIST’s scientists
do not put complete faith in any notion that quantum computing is intrinsically
limited by either technical problems or the P ≠ NP conjecture. The second, and
perhaps more significant point is the loose terminology of ‘large scale’ as opposed
to the usual (to the literature) ‘universal’22 quantum computer.
It has been generally considered that the goal of the field should be to produce
some type of quantum analogue to what we currently consider a computer to be,
a universal quantum computer, but this is unlikely to be the path that quantum
computing takes. It would make little sense, for example, not to take advantage
of the monumental advances in the field of AI in the development of new quantum
technologies, and since algorithms from the classical and quantum paradigms are
fundamentally different, in both concept and execution, a hybrid solution is the
most likely possibility. This idea is not new: parts of Shor’s algorithm are classical
in nature23 and the off-loading of compute-intensive operations to dedicated
devices such as GPUs for graphics and ASICs for cryptographic routines, for
example, is commonplace in current technologies. NIST itself states that it is aware
that groups are developing hybrid cryptographic schemes although it is not
considering such systems at present (NIST, 2017). In Europe, Europol echoes
NIST’s views, citing European Union funding for research into post-quantum
See Bitcoin Forum (2013) for example, a forum discussion on the proposed use of SHA-3 in
Bitcoin.
22 The mathematical model for a 'universal' computer also known as the Turing machine (Turing,
1936).
23 The first part of the Shor’s algorithm converts the factoring problem into the problem of
finding the period of a function, this is implemented classically.
21
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algorithm candidates and warning that industry needs to keep up to date with
developments if security is to be maintained (Europol, 2016).
It is not denied by NIST and other agencies concerned with information security
that quantum technologies, alone or as part of hybrid quantum-classical systems,
pose a real and largely unquantifiable threat in the medium to long term. The
question remains, however, if the response to this threat is adequate and
appropriate.

Information security in practice
The information security industry has developed and matured around an attackfix cycle in which some, but significantly not all, security attacks are detected and
analysed and appropriate 'fixes' are applied directly to systems or pushed out to
end users as part of software upgrades. Software and its security then continue to
operate as intended until the next attack and fix, or the next routine upgrade.
Attacks, when detected, are usually dealt with promptly and are rarely publicised
either because of their relative insignificance or because of fears of the damage to
trust they can cause. The detection and mitigation of security attacks is complex
and challenging but nonetheless generally relatively routine for most mature
organisations, with resources allocated to security proportional to the sensitivity
of information to be protected.
Nevertheless, no system is ideal and compromises are made to balance conflicting
requirements such as security and system response time, and this can mean
exposing the system to risk. For instance, ‘light’ encryption has been sometimes
used to avoid the computational overheads of RSA and similar protocols and here
the algorithms themselves may be the focus of attack. In June 2012, the business
network LinkedIn was targeted in a cyberattack in which the passwords of more
than 6 million users were stolen (Perlroth, 2018). It has been widely speculated,
that the passwords had been protected using an 'unsalted' Hash algorithm24 such
as SHA-1 or similar, a type of encryption known, even then (Theocharoulis et al.,

Unsalted hashes mean that when two or more users choose the same password, the same
hash is generated each time. In this scheme,an attacker who knows the hash for a given
password, can find the password whenever it is chosen by a new user. Hence commonly used or
'meaningful' (e.g. Italia90) passwords are easy to crack when unsalted hashes are used.
24
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2010), to be vulnerable to so called rainbow attacks 25. Some data from the attack
were posted to a Russian hacker site soon after and finally, in 2016, the full data
were offered for sale on the so called dark web (Mathews, 2017). Despite the
obvious vulnerability of SHA-1 and similar algorithms exposed by the 2012
LinkedIn attack, the Internet company Yahoo was the target of a similar attack on
its unsalted MD5 Hash-protected user data the following year, when 3 billion user
accounts26 were compromised (Stempel and Finkle, 2018). Interestingly, this
attack went undetected for some time until it was eventually discovered during
an investigation into a subsequent attack which took place in 2014, when 500
million user accounts were compromised. Yahoo claims that by the time of the
second attack it had moved 'the majority' of its accounts to the protection of
stronger encryption (Stempel and Finkle, 2018) offered by the more secure, but
resource-intensive, BCrypt algorithm (Alabaichi et al., 2013). Assuming Yahoo was
aware of the nature of the attack on LinkedIn and took immediate action to
protect its users, it seems to have taken the company at least two years to switch
one small algorithm for another, illustrating the challenges involved in such an
operation and perhaps suggesting difficulties with the organisation’s security
planning and maybe even with its overall software architecture.
Aside from the vulnerabilities of weak encryption, there exist vulnerabilities in the
implementation of stronger cryptographic protocols. Much attention was drawn
to the Alibaba Group’s UC browser in 2015 following the leaking of classified
documents by a former NSA contractor Edward Snowden 27. The leak suggested
that unencrypted geolocation and other data obtained from the browser were
used to track its users. Following the revelation, the Citizen Lab, a research
laboratory based in the University of Toronto, carried out an independent study
on the UC browser which showed that user privacy was compromised; however,
the lab could not confirm if the weaknesses that they found were those that were
highlighted by the leak. In 2015, the UC browser had approximately 500 million
users, most of whom were located in China and India. A later study on another
browser popular in China, Tencent’s QQ mobile browser (Knockel et al., 2018),

The attacker precalculates hashes of passwords before the attack and simply compares hashes
found in the attack with those precalculated hashes.
26 These large numbers indicate that some users set up numerous accounts and some were likely
to have be fraudulent accounts.
27 See, for example, The Guardian (2017).
25
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showed that data belonging to its hundreds of millions of users were also
vulnerable to a so called man-in-the-middle attack with ‘state actor capabilities’.
This research is of particular interest as it demonstrates weakness in ‘textbook
RSA’ implementations28. Such implementations are considered to be poor
cryptography but are nonetheless in use and provide the only security option
freely available to many millions of Internet users. Whether these weaknesses are
accidental or by design is open to debate – the Chinese companies involved both
conduct cutting-edge research, including research into quantum computation,
meaning there is strong support for the ‘by design’ argument in the revelations
made by Snowden. If the content of these documents is accurate, it is likely that
no browser is secure. However, security issues also exist elsewhere on the
Internet, including in areas where surveillance is unlikely to be currently a
contributory factor.
The ‘Internet of Things’, for example, makes extensive use of Radio-Frequency
IDentification or RFID tags. These tags or motes29 work wirelessly and remotely
and carry only around 2,000 bytes making it impossible for them to support strong
cryptographic protocols. Technologies in this early stage industry are still in a
phase of intensive evolution and despite guidance from organisations such as the
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), for
example, there is as yet no clear policy for security of the Internet of Things. 30 This
lack of policy, coupled with its generally weak security, creates a potential point
of vulnerability where the Internet of Things’ cyber-physical systems join the
Internet proper (Shah et al., 2016).
Even in the absence of quantum technologies, the security of systems which
interface with the Internet has been demonstrated to have considerable
vulnerability31. However, there are key areas which appear, at least, to be
considerably more secure and resilient. Areas such as banking and finance in
general, utilities such as national electricity grids and water and sensitive
industries and governments are generally better protected than social media
As RSA is described in textbooks with no enhancements.
mote or remote is a wireless transceiver that also acts as a remote sensor.
30 There exist a small number of industry specific IoT security frameworks and best practice
guidelines, all of which are still in the in development phase. There exists no overarching
standard to date. See, for example (Microsoft, 2018).
31 Non Internet facing systems are also at security risk, but attacks on these systems require
onsite access.
28

29A
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platforms, for example. Significantly though, any attacks on these critical systems
are likely to have serious and far reaching consequences.
From their early design phase, security in critical systems must be carefully
planned and managed according to relevant industry standards and organisational
policy. This is in stark contrast to the often ad hoc arrangements of less critical
systems. However, as critical systems evolve to meet changing requirements, or
in response to security threats and attacks, weaknesses will appear in their
security. If properly managed, weakness can generally be detected and analysed
and appropriate modifications made to the system to reestablish and maintain the
desired level of security. Ideally, this cycle continues until such a point as it is
decided that, for security, cost or operational reasons, the system should be
replaced. However, this cycle can be broken and consequently vulnerabilities in
security may appear. Sometimes, large complex systems may be insufficiently
understood by those who manage them and as the systems grow in complexity
through maintenance and modification, understanding lessens and vulnerability
increases. Although software companies may issue advice on operating system
and networking security etc., it may be difficult for organisations to interpret and
incorporate different strands of security information into a coherent secure policy
for their organisation, or the recommended security measures may simply be
beyond budgets. This is especially true in areas and times of political instability or
economic challenge, rendering systems that are critical to infrastructure
vulnerable to attack.
Since 2014, the computer systems of Ukraine’s state bodies, infrastructure, media,
transport and politics have repeatedly been the target of cyber attacks32. Russia
has been widely accused of backing the attackers but denies any involvement. The
scale of the attacks is unprecedented with, for example, more than 6,500 attacks
on state institutions over a two month period in late 2016 alone. These attacks
exploited a wide range of security loopholes and ranged from a highly
orchestrated operation in which the electricity supply from three separate
substations was cut off in a single attack33 to attacks on Ukraine’s financial and
transport sectors. It has been reported that the Sandworm group was responsible
Speaking to Wired magazine, the NATO ambassador with responsibility for cybersecurity
commented 'You can’t really find a space in Ukraine where there hasn’t been an attack'
(Greenberg A. 2017a).
33 Power was later manually switched on again by the electricity company’s engineers.
32
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for at least some of the attacks which involved malicious softwares including
BlackEnergy 3 and KillDisk (Fireeye, 2018). Sandworm specialises in trojan attacks
and is believed to have targeted ICS/SCADA and energy companies worldwide; it
is one of several Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups currently operating
globally (Greenberg, 2017). The US government has reported finding BlackEnergy
malware on the networks of American power and water utilities, although here
security was adequate to prevent damage (Greenberg, 2017a).
It has be suggested that the cyberwar on Ukraine has served as a de facto training
ground for groups such as Sandworm and other APT groups with some attacks first
seen in Ukraine quickly appearing in other jurisdictions.

Believed to have

originated in Ukraine, the NotPetya malware was responsible for a global rapid
cyber attack in June 2017. The malware obtains user credentials from an infected
host and uses them to connect to other points on the network, thus propagating
the malware. In this way, just one machine infected with the malicious software
can infect an entire system. NotPeyta, ostensibly a ransomware, has a highly
unsophisticated ransom collection mechanism but considerable data destruction
and encryption capabilities and consequently is considered not to be a true
ransomware but rather to be designed to cause maximum disruption and financial
loss to its targets (LogRhythm, 2017). It is likely that this malware was used as a
test or reconnaissance attack. NotPeyta appeared just one month after WannaCry,
another rapid cyber attack malware which caused major disruption in Spain, the
UK , Russia, Japan, France and Taiwan. Believed to have originated in North Korea,
this ransomware counted the British National Health Service (NHS) and Spain’s
telecoms company, Telefonica, among its victims. WannaCry 34 exploited a
weakness in Microsoft’s Windows operating system for which a security patch had
existed for about one month before the attack (Mathews, 2017a), highlighting the
delay some critical service providers have in implementing security updates.

The roles of artificial intelligence in security
AI has recently entered the field of cyber security, with companies offering
machine learning (ML) based defences against some of the most difficult and

One month before the WannaCry attack, a group called The Shadow Brokers released details of
the weakness that the ransomware exploited in Microsoft’s Operating Systems, it is alleged that
the weakness was originally discovered by the NSA. See, for example: (Gibbs, 2017)
34
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pervasive cyber attacks. A relatively sophisticated example comes from the UK
company Darktrace35 which has developed an algorithm, Enterprise Immune
System, that is capable of detecting and defending against malicious network
activity in near real time through the use of unsupervised ML techniques. This type
of machine learning allows the algorithm to detect known and novel threats by
actively self-learning patterns of normal and abnormal network behaviours rather
than depending on known rules, models or datasets. Darktrace’s software has
been demonstrated, for example, to detect a new strain of ransomware in a
network and to have the ability to counter that attack in a time frame of under
one minute36. The algorithm has also been demonstrated to limit an 'exfiltration
of data by an insider' attack (theft and export of data to the Cloud, for example)
(Viega, 2018). In principle, this self-learning approach provides an added layer of
security by constantly searching networks and interconnected networks for
anomalous areas in large data sets and making decisions to act when deemed
necessary. In contrast, traditional approaches depend on searching for evidence
that exactly matches predescribed attacks and so novel attacks and approaches
can go undetected.
In cyber security, artificial intelligence is dual use: it has the potential to be used
in both defence and attack. AI network security algorithms may be vulnerable to
data poisoning attacks, for example, in which misleading data is introduced by an
attacker. Such an attack might be used as part of a scheme to train a network to
tolerate intrusion. It is also likely that unsupervised ML might be used in more
sophisticated and labour intensive attacks such as spear phishing,37 for example,
where AI simulates more human-like behaviours and so attacks more readily
escape detection. The potential of this so called ‘adversarial AI’ is not fully known;
however, attacks as diverse as speech synthesis for impersonation, attacks that
subvert cyber physical systems such as self-drive cars and the automation of
techniques involved in surveillance, for example, are expected in the near to
medium term38 (Brundage and Avin, 2018).
According to its website (www.darktrace.com), Darktrace was founded in Cambridge, UK, in
2013 by mathematicians and machine learning specialists from the University of Cambridge,
together with world-leading intelligence experts from MI5 and GCHQ.
36 Attackers often spend months inside a network before being detected.
37 Spear phishing involves an attempt to steal sensitive information from targeted individuals via
electronic means.
38 Here, near to medium term is within the next five years.
35
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The advent of AI as a security threat poses enormous challenges, challenges that
translate into increased financial burden for organisations with data to protect. It
is likely that as AI matures there will be a cycle of rapid growth in both AI defence
and attack technologies. In response to this perceived threat, in February 2018, a
group of 26 specialists from a wide range of disciplines and institutions including
Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute, Cambridge University’s Centre
for the Study of Existential Risk, OpenAI and the Center for a New American
Security39 published a report on the potential security risks of AI. The one hundred
page document, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting,
Prevention, and Mitigation (Brundage and Avin 2018), outlines the group’s
understanding of current and potential future threats posed by AI to security and
makes a number of recommendations for future research and development, as
well as highlighting the importance of governance and policy. The report details
what its authors see as risks related to the publishing of potentially sensitive
details of AI research (a practice common to all areas of computer science) and
strongly recommends collaboration between the research community and
governments in efforts to anticipate and mitigate AI attacks. The report focuses
on the need to develop policies and regulation that are informed by technology
expertise and are properly enforceable in the domain without unnecessarily
restricting research. The authors draw attention to examples of introductory
resources for policymakers in AI (CNAS, 2017; Buchanan and Taylor, 2017).
Already, there is much ongoing research in the area of Adversarial AI in particular
(Brundage and Avin, 2018) and digital security in general, for example, by the
National Cyber Security Centre as part of GCHQ in the UK (National Cyber Security
Centre, 2018). A high proportion of large scale projects include workshopping and
similar initiatives involving representatives of large technology companies,
government agencies and research institutions. Many of these projects focus on
US security concerns and are often aligned with political research centres such as
the Harvard Kennedy Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, which in
2018 lists three ongoing projects: Managing the Atom, a project concerned with
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; Managing the Microbe, concerned
with the threat of biological weapons; and the Cyber Security Project, which

39

The Center for a New American Security is a US-based bipartisan national security think-tank.
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concerns itself with how cybersecurity will shape international conflict (Belfer
Center, 2018).

The implications of maturing quantum technologies
Due to the fundamental vulnerabilities inherent in current AI systems
(vulnerabilities to data poisoning and model inversion 40 for example), an increase
in adversarial AI attacks is likely as AI technologies become more pervasive. These
attacks are expected to be especially effective, finely targeted and difficult to
attribute (Brundage and Avin 2018). The task of mitigating an increasingly
enhanced attack load, including diverse and dynamic threats coming from
adversarial AI, will eventually be beyond the capabilities and budgets of many
organisations and infrastructure agencies. One possible response to such
challenge is to move to fortified secure platforms where a collective security is
provided by an overarching well-resourced body. This is not an entirely new idea:
already, for many organisations, the increasing complexity of the task of providing
a secure integrated internet environment has been met, for example, by the use
of Google Cloud41 together with G Suite (a platform that provides secure
integrated electronic mailing (gmail); document Cloud storage (Google Docs);
device management (Google Mobile) and other related services) (G Suite, 2018).
As technology companies such as Google position themselves to provide more
comprehensive secure options to businesses and infrastructure facing growing
security threats to their operation, the slow response to recommendations of
collaboration between the research community, industry and governments in
addressing the growing menace of adversarial AI is likely to be too little too late.
If technology companies can provide protection to businesses, infrastructure and
possibly even some governments, that exceeds any other option that these
organisations have available to them, it is likely that many will migrate their
operations to these secure environments. It is probable that there will be at least
some competition in the space; however, it is also likely that only a few small to
medium sized organisations will be sufficiently resourced and competent to
provide for an independent fully integrated secure environment as the adversarial

In model inversion, the training data of a classifier is manipulated.
Machine learning tools and APIs; the enterprise Maps APIs; and also the Android phones,
tablets and Chromebooks that access the cloud.
40
41

164

Irish Communications Review vol 16 (2018)

AI threat grows. Unless governments provide an alternative, small to medium
sized organisations will have little option outside of the secure spaces provided by
the technology companies.
In the near term, there remain non-Google alternatives for individuals and
organisations requiring secure Cloud and communications facilities. Google is not
the largest of cloud-based services: Amazon, Microsoft Azure and IBM are all
technically bigger, as are China’s Tencent and Alibaba. Google, however, offers
perhaps the most obviously and fully integrated secure platform, with an
emphasis on seamless integration of services and machine learning. Significantly,
Google also has a post-quantum cryptography programme and recently the
company substituted the RSA algorithm in Google Chrome with New Hope, a postquantum algorithm (Pascaline, 2016). The New Hope algorithm is known to be less
than secure against certain post-quantum attacks – it has known vulnerabilities to
attack by a system with quantum capabilities (Malloy and Hollenbeck, 2016).
Consequently, it is unlikely that Google considers the New Hope algorithm to be a
credible candidate for the replacement of RSA in Chrome; in its current iteration
at least. It is more likely that the purpose of this exercise was to assess the
company’s capability of swapping out encryption algorithms without any
downtime or incident. If this is the case, the exercise was likely considered
successful. In the absence of truly secure post-quantum algorithms, it is essential
that such swaps be easily and immediately achievable at the first sign of attack in
order to limit data exposure or loss and it is likely that the large technology
companies are continually researching and assessing new candidate postquantum cryptographic algorithms. As discussed earlier, NIST expects that postquantum encryption algorithms may differ significantly in their underlying
mathematics and design from those in current use, making swapping out
encryption algorithms in a live system a truly challenging task, far beyond the
capabilities of all but a very few organisations.
As we approach the post-quantum horizon, the time when a device can efficiently
and cost effectively run Shor’s algorithm, it is possible that large, well designed
and competently managed systems of commerce and infrastructure with good AIenhanced security will remain adequately secure, even in the face of adversarial
AI. However, every instance of RSA-based cryptography will remain potentially
vulnerable to attack, as any development of quantum and hybrid quantum devices
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for malicious purposes will naturally be covert in nature. For all but the most
expert technology companies, preemptive substitution of current public key
cryptographic algorithms with post-quantum alternatives brings a high risk of
weakening security. As quantum technologies mature, the only remaining viable
option for even large mature organisations and many governments may be to
move to a commercial platform offering post-quantum secured, AI-enhanced
cloud, device management and communication services. Such a scenario would
afford Google – and any other company which emerges with similar capabilities –
potentially enormous political leverage as that horizon comes into view.
The recommendation from the Brundage and Avin (2018) report that
governments should partner with research institutes to address these threats is
important. These partnerships should work toward the development of secure
platforms in the public domain outside of commercial technology companies such
as Google. These post-quantum platforms need only be relatively rudimentary;
however, it is essential that they offer the required security at low or zero cost to
the user. There is a role for the EU here and at some of the funds already allocated
to quantum technologies could possibly be directed to such a project. For poorer
countries, such development should be taken on by the open-source community,
in coordination with NGOs and multilateral institutions. This is essential to protect
against these countries becoming unduly dependent on technology companies for
their infrastructural and national security.
Secondly, during the phase of development of post-quantum algorithms, exposure
to and understanding of the quantum paradigm needs to be increased. As
highlighted by Harrow (2012), in addition to using computers to solve problems,
we also think in ways that are informed by the programming and use of computers
in the current paradigm. To a large extent, we frame and attempt to understand
and solve many of the problems we encounter in terms of ideas and methods of
information transmission, optimization and error correction. Concepts as diverse
as sentiment analysis, weather forecasting and cognitive processes are all
described within the bounds of our classical computational paradigm and our
understandings are thus limited by its constraints.
Ideas of security, cryptography and the nature of information itself are also subject
to the paradigm in which they are conceived and operate. Quantum computation,
like the quantum theory that lies behind it, is counter-intuitive when viewed
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through a classical lens. It is impossible to anticipate the novel approaches that
will emerge from the field of quantum computation unless we are engaged in the
paradigm. It is essential that we democratise the understanding of quantum
information theory and normalise the use of its concepts in order to ensure that
the paradigm shift in computing is not the preserve of a small corporate elite and
a few, often corporate sponsored, research institutions. The Microsoft
corporation has already made available a high-level accessible independent
development environment (IDE), the Microsoft Quantum Development Kit, which
works with Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft, 2018a). More similar initiatives,
ideally from the open source community, would improve popular exposure to
quantum computation. Explicit coding skills may not be required to familiarize the
public with quantum information theory; initiatives such as the development of
games that operate in the quantum paradigm would also provide an attractive
introduction to the field and should be sponsored by government funds. Only
widespread popular adoption and understanding of the quantum paradigm can
prevent undesirable monopolies.
The final strand of defence of an independent Internet in an AI-enhanced postquantum era is the prompt introduction of appropriate and effective legislation.
Such legislation should be developed in partnership with domain experts in
information security, government policy experts and the research community to
ensure that any new legislation can be implemented in such a way that its
intention is properly realisable. This was not the case in the drafting of the
European Union’s recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation. It
has been reported that this legislation has been difficult to implement in many
cases due to its lack of compatibility with the nature and workings of the domain
in which it is intended to operate and in particular in the context of current
machine-learning algorithms (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016). Furthermore, the
way we make and implement legislation needs to be reconsidered here and in
relation to information technologies in general. The legal processes we use must
be fit for purpose and capable of anticipating change. This does not mean that
legislation needs to predict the precise changes that will occur – this is not possible
– but rather legal processes must be such that they are capable of responding to
a dynamic system of shifting and interacting paradigms; this will require both new
processes and interdisciplinary expertise. Scholars from the social sciences and
humanities can and must engage with developments that have the most profound
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implications for the future of human communications: mapping the potentially
extraordinary computational horizon is far too important to be left to computer
scientists – or, simply, to Google.
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